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The macroeconomic effects of a pandemic in Europe. 
A model-based assessment 
 
 
By Lars Jonung and Werner Roeger, 






Abstract: This report estimates possible macroeconomic effects of a pandemic taking place in 
the EU in 2006, using a quarterly macroeconomic model. The macroeconomic costs of a 
pandemic, that is the cost in terms of production lost due to illness and death measured as 
reductions in GDP growth and/or declines in the level of GDP, are quantified in various 
pandemic scenarios. We focus on two sectors of the European economy that are expected to 
be particularly severely hit, tourism and trade. The results are compared with those obtained 
in similar studies. Our basic conclusion is that, although a pandemic would take a huge toll in 
human suffering, it would most likely not be a severe threat to the European macroeconomy.  
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The spread of avian flu has led to fears of a worldwide pandemic. This fear is based on the 
view that the H5N1 bird flu virus may mutate into a disease that will easily and rapidly spread 
from human to human and that no effective vaccine will exist to counter such an outbreak. In 
response to this possible health catastrophe, several reports on the economic consequences of 
a major epidemic have been produced recently. So far there has been no study of the potential 
consequences of a pandemic on the economies of the EU Member States.  
The purpose of this report is to fill this gap by estimating the likely macroeconomic effects of 
a pandemic using a quarterly macro-model constructed and calibrated for the EU-25 as one 
single economic entity. The use of such a macro-model has several advantages.  
First of all, it covers a number of substitution and interaction effects that previous quantitative 
work on pandemics has tended to either ignore or be unable to quantify. Models based on 
simple “mechanical” assumptions may disregard the major feature of a modern economy, 
namely its flexibility and adaptability when exposed to shocks. A pandemic is a truly negative 
exogenous shock propagating its effects through the economic system and should be 
modelled as such.  
Second, by adopting a quarterly macro-model, we are able to quantify the economic effects of 
a health catastrophe in both the short run and the long run as well as in the transition path 
between these two stages. Studies based on annual models are less suited as pandemics 
usually occur over a period of a few months, making a quarter a suitable observation period.  
Third, a large macro-model facilitates the study of various assumptions concerning the 
severity of a pandemic. Finally, using a macro-model for the whole of the EU makes it easier 
for us to compare our results with those derived for the United States. 
At this stage, we would like to make two qualifications. First, our aim is to quantify the 
macroeconomic costs of an exogenous shock of a pandemic, that is the cost in terms of 
production lost due to illness and death measured as reductions in GDP growth and/or 
declines in the level of GDP. We are not estimating the economic costs which occur in terms 
of loss of health and of life, neither are we able to describe the human suffering and tragedies 
associated with a pandemic.  
Second, before presenting our estimates, we want to stress the great uncertainties involved in 
all steps necessary in arriving at the results in our scenarios. The uncertainty is particularly 
                                                 
1 We have benefited from constructive comments by Bob Arnold, Tommy Bengtsson, Helen Chan, 
Steven James, Magnus Johannesson, Bengt Jönsson, Roman Kräussel and Svenn-Erik Mamelund. 
We would like to thank Sophie Bland for linguistic guidance.   
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great as the world has not experienced a major pandemic in recent times. We do not know if, 
when and where it will happen and how it will evolve. There have been considerable 
advances in medical technology since the last major worldwide pandemic, the Spanish 
influenza in 1918-19, making it extremely difficult to forecast and estimate the impact of a 
future pandemic.  
This report is organized as follows. First, we briefly consider some studies on the economic 
effects of large epidemics, focusing on the assumptions concerning the characteristics of a 
future pandemic, as these assumptions are extremely crucial for the results obtained. Second, 
we perform a number of simulations using a macro-model developed within DG ECFIN, the 
QUEST model, to study various pandemic scenarios; first a baseline scenario, then the same 
scenario modified by the introduction of new assumptions. Here, we compare our results with 
those obtained for the United States. Third, we examine the impact on tourism and trade, two 




Fear of a massive outbreak of the avian flu, reaching pandemic proportions, has led to an 
interest in other pandemics in history, particularly the two major catastrophes of the bubonic 
plague or Black Death in the mid-14
th century and the Spanish influenza in 1918-19. 
However, there have also been many pandemics of lesser magnitude. Potter (2001) identifies 
about 10 pandemics in the past 300 years, arguing that there is a recurrent although not 
regular periodic pattern, so that we should not rule out the possibility of new medical disasters 
of this type in the future. According to Kilbourne (2005), the world was hit by three 
pandemics in the 20
th century: the Spanish influenza in 1918, the Asian influenza in 1957 and 
the Hong Kong influenza in 1968. Of these the Spanish flu was by far the most severe, killing 
between 30 and 60 million.  
Studies of the macroeconomic impact in the past of pandemics and of other major diseases 
such as SARS and HIV/AIDS have attempted to quantify the consequences in terms of lost 
output and growth. However, there is little consensus. The results depend crucially on the 
models used and on the availability of data. Although the literature on the Black Death is 
substantial, researchers have not reached firm conclusions concerning its long-run effects, 
according to Bell and Lewis (2004, p. 159). 
A study by Brainerd and Siegler (2003), one of the few on the economic effects of the 
Spanish influenza, suggests that the 1918-19 pandemic in the US actually increased economic 
growth in the 1920s.
2 Similarly, using a theoretical economic model, Young (2004) argues 
that the AIDS epidemic in South Africa will increase net future per capita consumption – 
while Bell and Gersbach (2004) find strong negative effects. Still, studies of the past give us 
valuable information about the proper assumptions to make when “guesstimating” the 
macroeconomic impact of future pandemics.  
                                                 
2 In contrast, Almond and Mazumder (2005) argue that the Spanish influenza had very long-term 
negative effects, even as late as 65-80 years after the pandemic, through its impact on fetal health.   
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As mentioned above, the outbreak of avian flu has led to a flow of reports on the possible 
economic consequences of a future worldwide health disaster.
3 Admittedly these reports are 
very variable in quality, some being rather speculative, lacking a solid analytical base, 
presenting lists of possible effects, and calculating the costs solely in pecuniary terms. 
However, a few reports assess the potential macroeconomic effects of a new pandemic using 
economic models, like the study by the US Congressional Budget Office from December 
2005 “A Potential Influenza Pandemic: Possible Macroeconomic Effects and Policy Issues”.
4 
Similarly, James and Sargent (2006) at the Economic Analysis and Forecasting Division of 
the Canadian Department of Finance have calculated the economic impact of a pandemic for 
Canada. McKibbin and Sidorenko (2006) estimate the global economic consequences of a 
pandemic using a 20-country model of Asia. These are excellent up-to-date summaries and 
useful as benchmark cases for this study of Europe.  
Any estimate of the effects of a pandemic must, as is the case in the above-mentioned reports, 
combine two sets of assumptions or “models”. The first set concerns the spread and impact of 
the pandemic from a medical/health perspective, while the second considers the choice of 
economic model and techniques to adopt to estimate the economic effects, once the medical 
assumptions are given. Of course, the final result depends on the initial choice of both the 
medical and the economic “model”. 
Three medical variables related to the pandemic are crucial for the estimation of its economic 
effects: the morbidity rate (the percentage of the population infected), the number of work 
weeks lost, and the mortality rate (the percentage of those infected that die). Data on these 
key numbers can be taken from studies of past pandemics.  
A major impression of the reports on the future effects of a pandemic on the economy is the 
uncertainty surrounding any attempt to quantify its impact ex ante. So many uncertainties are 
involved that some observers argue that publishing scenarios dealing with the impact of a 
future pandemic on the scale of the 1918-1919 Spanish influenza – which may not happen – 
entails a serious risk of creating undue alarm, which may ultimately prove to be 
counterproductive.  
The optimists suggest that progress in medical science since the Spanish influenza will 
prevent any future pandemic having major repercussions, that today’s health systems are well 
prepared to respond quickly and efficiently, that progress in vaccine technology means that 
we can rapidly develop new vaccines, etc.
5 Thus we should not expect any disasters, nor 
create pessimistic scenarios that will engender unnecessary fear and thus costs to society. 
More cautious commentators argue that the risks are real and that we should plan accordingly. 
The pattern of pandemics in the past suggests that we can expect more in the future although 
                                                 
3 See Bell and Lewis (2004) for a short survey of the economic consequences of pandemics. 
4 At the request of the US Senate, the CBO turned to both medical and economic expertise to assess 
the macroeconomic effects on the US economy. The perspective is a domestic one. The worldwide 
consequences are not considered, nor are the trade effects on the US economy. The report is also 
careful not to make any policy recommendations – concerning either public health or macroeconomic 
policies.  
5 The role of governments and markets in the production of vaccine in the event of a future avian flu 
pandemic has been much debated recently. See Forslid (2005) for one policy proposal.  
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there is no strict pandemic periodicity.
6 In our view, history shows that the risks are real. 
Hence, we believe there is a need for policy-makers to have estimates of the possible – 
although not likely or certain – economic effects of a future pandemic in Europe. 
 
3. The macroeconomic effects of a pandemic in Europe 
 
In this section we use the quarterly QUEST model developed within DG ECFIN. This is a 
standard New Keynesian macro-model of the world economy as described by Roeger and in ’t 
Veld (2004). Production is modelled with a neoclassical production function using capital and 
labour as input. The life-cycle hypothesis is used to model consumption. A fraction of 
households are liquidity-constrained. Firms operate under monopolistic competition in the 
goods market and form their price, labour demand and investment decisions by maximising 
the present value of their cash flow, taking into account technological constraints and demand 
conditions for their respective products. Firms also face adjustment costs for prices, 
employment and capital. Wages are determined on an imperfectly competitive labour market. 
Nominal rigidities prevent a rapid response of nominal wages and prices to economic shocks. 
The regions of the world are linked through trade and international financial flows. 
We first derive a set of baseline projections using the QUEST model. Next we extend the 
simulations in a number of steps. 
 
3.1 The baseline simulation 
 
For our baseline scenario, we adopt the medical assumptions used in the study by the US 
Congressional Budget Office (2005) concerning a future pandemic and feed them into our 
model for the European economy.  
We do this for two reasons. First, the key assumptions concerning the morbidity rate, the 
mortality rate, etc. for a future pandemic in the US are derived from past pandemics and 
appear as well-founded, even if they are still guesses. Second, the estimates pertaining to the 
US economy in the CBO projections should serve as a useful comparison with the results of 
our study concerning the European economy as there are a number of similarities between the 
US and EU economies.  
The CBO report presents two scenarios – a severe and a mild one. In the severe scenario, 90 
million Americans are infected – corresponding to a morbidity or gross attack rate of 30 per 
cent – and of these about 2 million are assumed to die – corresponding to a mortality rate 
(case fatality rate) of 2.5 per cent. In the mild scenario, the attack rate is set at 25 per cent and 
the fatality rate 1.14 per cent. A number of additional assumptions are made concerning 
weeks off work across various sectors, etc. These numbers are derived from studies of past 
pandemics.  
                                                 
6 See for example Dowdle (2006), who concludes that there is no predictable pattern of occurrence of 
pandemics.  
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To calculate the economic effects on the EU of a future pandemic, we adopt the severe 
scenario from the CBO report. Thus, we assume a pandemic in Europe to have a morbidity 
rate of 30 per cent and a mortality rate of 2.5 per cent. We also assume that the number of 
weeks off work due to the pandemic is on average 3 weeks. This holds for both those who are 
infected and those who choose to stay at home to care for the sick. Sickness and mortality 
rates are assumed to be uniformly distributed over age cohorts.  
Applying these figures on sickness and mortality rates to the EU-25 suggests that about 150 
million Europeans will become sick for three weeks and 2.5 per cent of those, in other words 
0.75 per cent of the total population, will die.  
These assumptions concerning overall population mortality are on the high side compared to 
the evidence from the Spanish influenza of 1918-1910, for which Patterson and Pyle (1991, 
table 1) estimate an average mortality rate in Europe of about 0.5 per cent. They suggest 
roughly the same number for Canada and the United States. Johnson and Mueller (2002) 
arrive at almost identical mortality rates for Europe and North America.
7 Thus, our baseline 
projection presented below founded on a total population mortality rate of 7.5 deaths per 
thousand represents a more pessimistic flu scenario than the Spanish influenza, which was the 
worst pandemic anywhere in the world during the 20
th century. 
Our assumption of an average of three weeks off due to the pandemic is also higher than the 
pattern from the past. Kilbourne (2006) notes that during the Spanish influenza those infected 
typically were only ill with a fever for 3-5 days, so that the total period of disease was shorter.  
From past evidence we know that pandemics do not extend over long periods of time. Most of 
the effect is confined to a period of about three to four months. Thus, we assume that the 
pandemic will only last for one quarter. In this scenario the pandemic has an identical health 
impact on the rest of the world outside Europe. Concerning the timing of the pandemic we 
allow it to start in the first quarter of 2006. This is done only for technical reasons since it 
makes it easier to demonstrate the annual impact and compare it with studies based on annual 
models.  
 
Supply and demand effects: When calculating the economic effects, we distinguish between 
supply and demand effects. The supply effects arise from a loss in hours worked, while the 
demand effects or psychological effects result mainly from precautionary measures taken by 
the population to avoid infection. It is likely that certain activities, like travelling and meeting 
and socializing with other people in restaurants, bars, cinemas, etc. will be substantially 
reduced. This is clearly illustrated by the experience from the SARS epidemic in Hong Kong 
in the second quarter of 2003, when tourism fell by 90 per cent in two months. 
In our baseline QUEST simulations, sickness is captured via a temporary decline in the 
efficiency of the persons employed. In addition, we assume a permanent negative shock to the 
population level of 0.75 per cent. This is the fundamental supply shock associated with the 
pandemic.  
It is instructive to isolate the supply from the demand effects. Therefore we simulate in a first 
step the effect of the pandemic under the assumption that there are no demand effects and 
consider supply and demand effects jointly in a second step. We arrive at a total supply effect 
                                                 
7 The incidence of the Spanish flu also varied considerably across countries and within countries. See 
for example Mamelund (2003) on the experience of Norway.  
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for 2006 of -1.1 per cent as a fall in the GDP level from the baseline projection as reported in 
column (i) in Table 1.  
Demand effects are important as well. The pandemic is likely to affect specific sectors related 
to tourism and entertainment (bars, restaurants, etc.) In 2004, the value added in these sectors 
accounted for 4.4 per cent of GDP in the EU-25, comparable to the CBO estimate for the US. 
Using the assumption that demand would decline by 80 per cent (in line with the CBO’s 
estimate), this amounts to a demand shock of 3.5 per cent of GDP in one quarter.
8 The 
demand effect amounts to -0.5 per cent of GDP in 2006 – see column (ii) in Table 1.  
Under the assumption that the epidemic breaks out in the first quarter of 2006, and combining 
the supply and demand effect, we arrive at a drop in EU GDP growth in 2006 of 1.6 
percentage points according to our calculations. See column (iii) in Table 1. Instead of 
growing at 2.1 per cent in 2006, as projected in DG ECFIN’s autumn 2005 forecast, the EU-
25 economy would grow by only 0.5 per cent.  
In absolute terms, the output loss in 2006 would amount to about 180 billion euros. However, 
for 2007 a recovery is projected and GDP growth would be one percentage point higher than 
the baseline projection. Eventually, the GDP of EU-25 would approach a level which is 0.75 
per cent below the baseline because of the permanent decline of the population and thus of the 
labour force in Europe. Obviously, this is an average EU effect. However, it is likely that the 
Mediterranean countries would be more heavily affected because of their larger tourist 
industry.  
About two thirds of the total effect is supply-induced while one third is demand-induced. 
There are two reasons why the annual demand effect is smaller than the direct or immediate 
impact effect. First, we assume a monetary policy reaction. According to the Taylor rule, built 
into the QUEST model, the ECB would lower interest rates in 2006 (by close to 100 basis 
points) to offset the fall in economic activity. This reduces the negative effect on consumption 
spending and slightly raises investment.
9 Second, the negative consumption shock in the first 
quarter is in fact a positive shock on savings. These additional savings are partly spent in the 
quarters following the pandemic. Both effects also explain why the demand effects in the 
years following the pandemic will be slightly positive.  
When interpreting these numbers, it must be kept in mind that they are also based on the 
assumption that automatic stabilisers in the form of health insurance and government transfers 
are in place, covering medical costs and providing income support, thus dampening the 
economic impact of the pandemic.
10 
                                                 
8 The effect on tourism by a pandemic is likely to depend strongly on the date at which the pandemic 
occurs. Since most tourist activities occur in the summer months, the GDP effect of a pandemic would 
be larger if it occurred in the third quarter. There is also a wide variation across EU countries: 
Mediterranean countries would be hit relatively hard during a pandemic, since the tourist sector in, for 
example, Greece and Spain accounts for 8 to 9 per cent of GDP.  
9 Investment actually slightly declines in the first year because the supply effect on investment 
predominates over the demand effect. 
10 It is assumed that government expenditure stays constant.  
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The recovery: How fast and strong will the recovery be after the pandemic? Figure 1 
provides the quarterly growth profile of GDP in the EU, that is the deviation of growth rates 
under alternative assumptions from the baseline growth rate. Figure 1 demonstrates that in 
terms of growth rates, there will be a rapid recovery in the quarter following the pandemic.  
The pandemic itself is assumed to last for only about one quarter. On the supply side, people 
resume work and consumers return to their previous consumption habits quickly. This 
adjustment pattern is known from previous pandemics. See Figure 2 showing GDP growth in 
Hong Kong around the SARS epidemic in the second quarter of 2003. In the case of SARS, 
GDP rose rapidly in the third quarter of 2003 after declining in the second quarter. This rapid 
increase in growth was primarily due to tourists and visitors from mainland China returning 
and Hong Kong citizens not immediately resuming foreign travel.  
A similar pattern emerges from the Spanish influenza. The Canadian study by James and 
Sargent (2006) shows monthly real US retail sales figures for the years 1918 and 1919 from 
the NBER Macro History Database. The pandemic, which started in September 1918 and 
lasted until December 1918, led to negative retail sales growth of about -2 per cent in 
November and -6 per cent in December. However, after the pandemic in January 1919, retail 
sales growth jumped to 8 per cent. Reallocation of consumption from one quarter to another is 
also known from other disasters. For example, the 9/11 terrorist attack also led to a substantial 
reallocation of consumption from the third to the fourth quarter in 2001.   
3.2. Alternative scenarios 
We must be aware that more pessimistic scenarios are possible, even if we stick to the 
morbidity and mortality assumptions adopted above for our severe scenario. There exist 
downside risks on both the supply and the demand side. On the supply side, the fear of being 
infected may prevent healthy people from going to work. Also, important trade linkages could 
break down, interrupting the flow of intermediate inputs in production. On the demand side, 
the psychological effects could also be larger than in the scenario above, and sometimes there 
is a worry that stock markets and other financial markets will be negatively affected. We 
comment below on these qualifications. 
Rate of absenteeism: Our simulations assume that those who are not infected actually go to 
work. There is of course the risk that healthy people may stay at home as well because they 
are afraid of infection. In this case the disruption of production could be more severe. 
However, the extent to which this would happen is a matter of speculation. The evidence from 
previous pandemics does not show a large decline in labour input. James and Sargent (2006), 
looking at the 1918, 1957 and 1968 pandemics, do not find significant increases in the rate of 
absenteeism.  
Trade effects during a pandemic: The baseline simulation assumes no bottleneck effects from 
trade. Such bottleneck effects could arise in cases where the EU is heavily dependent on 
specific intermediate inputs from certain regions in the world. Appendix A lists the 50 
products (using a 3-digit classification) on which the EU is most dependent on one (out of 8) 
regions in the rest of the world.  
Only for energy does the EU seem to have a genuine strategic dependence on specific 
intermediates. Obviously, for oil, the EU is strongly dependent on the Middle East (from 
where about 95 per cent of all extra-EU oil imports originate). There is also some dependence 
on the US for products such as engines and parts, aircraft and pharmaceutical products. But  
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these are products with a high intra-EU trade share as well. It is likely that they could be 
substituted by domestic production in the EU. The EU does not depend strongly on South-
East Asia or China for intermediate products. To sum up, the data in Appendix A on 
intermediate goods trade suggests that a pandemic is not likely to cause major problems for 
the EU via production bottlenecks. 
It can be argued that trade effects should play a larger role today than during previous 
epidemics. There is certainly some truth to this view. However, the empirical evidence 
suggests that it is mostly tourism/personal travel that is affected, not trade in goods. It has also 
been argued that past pandemics may have caused larger disruptions because of the then 
prevailing on-site assembly-line mode of production, in contrast to the vertically integrated 
production that currently predominates, which can avail itself of a variety of supply sources.  
Additional demand effects: Though we consider tourism and entertainment as sectors which 
are likely to be negatively affected, there are studies which also explore demand shortfalls for 
other sectors as well. Psychological effects are important; this was the case in the SARS 
epidemic. There was only a small supply-side effect, but consumption was strongly affected.  
We therefore also study a scenario with a more severe psychological effect. The CBO, for 
example, fears strong negative effects for all types of transport, community, social and 
personal services, retail and wholesale and also a decline in demand for manufacturing 
products of around 10 per cent. Table 2 shows how these demand effects are distributed 
across sectors of the US economy according to the CBO estimates. Using the same 
assumptions and applying EU weights, we arrive at a negative demand effect of 11 per cent in 
the quarter in which the pandemic occurs.  
Taking these more serious demand effects into account, the demand shortfall in the quarter in 
which the pandemic strikes would be about 11 per cent in the EU and the GDP loss in 2006 
could be about 3.3 per cent (See column (iv) in Table 1.) 
Stock market effects: The historical evidence suggests that the effects on stock markets of 
pandemics are insignificant. If they occurred, we do not know by how much or for how long 
stock prices would fall. In the case of a prolonged fall in share prices of 10 per cent, the 
QUEST model gives an additional negative output effect in the range of between -0.2 and -0.8 
per cent, depending on the monetary policy response and how the stock market affects 
investment and consumption. However, since it is likely that the decline in stock prices would 
be only temporary, the effect would be much smaller and below -0.1 per cent in the first year.  
 
Length of the pandemic: In our simulations it is assumed that the pandemic would be rather 
short-lived and would be over within one quarter. This was the case with the Spanish 
influenza. Of course, if it were to drag on for longer, then both the negative demand and 
supply effects would be larger. Under the assumption that 60 per cent of the population would 
fall sick over a period of two quarters (but keeping the mortality rate as before) and extending 
the demand effects over two quarters, we arrive at a first-year effect of -2.6 per cent. 
 
Annual growth effect depends on the timing of the pandemic: Given the fact that the economic 
effects of a pandemic are rather short-lived, it is also interesting to see how the effects would 
be distributed over the two years depending on when the pandemic strikes during the year. 
Results are shown in Table 3, which demonstrates the dynamics of the pandemic. Essentially,  
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the later the pandemic occurs in the year, the smaller the effect in 2006 and the less of a 
recovery in 2007.  
 
4. Comparisons with other studies 
 
The QUEST simulation results are neither at the lower nor the upper end of the set of 
available estimates, as shown in Table 4 where we compare our estimates with those from 
other studies covering the United States, Canada and the world. The numbers in Table 4 are 
not fully comparable as they are based on different medical and economic assumptions. Still 
they give a fairly uniform picture. 
We have adopted many assumptions from the CBO report in order to facilitate comparisons 
with the United States. In the severe scenario in the CBO report, the impact on the US 
economy would be “slightly larger” than during a typical recession in the post-World War II 
period – the level of GDP will decline by 5 per cent during the year of the pandemic. The 5 
per cent is the sum of a 3 per cent supply-side effect and 2 per cent demand effect.  
In the mild scenario, US economic growth will slow, but the level of GDP will not decline. In 
short, a mild influenza pandemic will not have a major macroeconomic impact. The focus of 
the CBO study is on the short-run effects. The reports simply states that “there is little 
evidence available to use” to analyse the long-run and the very long-run effects.  
It is instructive to compare our results to the CBO study in more detail. In our view the 
following factors explain the differences: 
1. Labour productivity assumption: The CBO does not use a macro-model to calculate the 
effects. Instead the output loss is simply calculated by taking average labour productivity and 
estimating the output loss by applying average labour productivity to the decline in 
employment. In other words, the CBO assumes an output elasticity of employment equal to 
one. In the QUEST model we use a production function for calculating output, using capital 
and labour. Here the (short-run) output elasticity of labour is around 0.6. This explains a large 
part of the difference in the supply effect.  
2. Overtime and capacity utilisation. In the QUEST model, there is a temporary increase in 
the work effort (increase in hours worked) of the still-healthy employees during the 
pandemic. Consequently, instead of declining by 7.5 per cent in the second quarter of 2006, 
actual labour input (hours worked) only declines by about 6.6 per cent. Without an increase in 
labour effort, the supply-induced GDP decline in the first year could increase in absolute 
terms to -1.3 per cent. 
3. Demand effects. The CBO study assumes an extra consumption demand effect of around 
2/3 of the supply effect. This demand effect corresponds to our extreme scenario. However, 
because of the stabilisation brought about by monetary policy and an endogenous response of 
consumption and investment the total demand effect for the whole year is smaller than the 
initial shock.  
The study for Canada by James and Sargent (2006) estimates that the hypothetical impact of a 
1918-type pandemic (25 per cent sickness rate and 5 per cent mortality rate) would have a 
negative impact of -0.75 per cent in the year of the outbreak, assuming there is no panic 
among the population. The total impact of a hypothetical 1957-type influenza pandemic (with 
a sickness rate of less than 10 per cent) is estimated to be -0.3 per cent. These numbers are 
close to our estimates. See Table 4.   
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The German RWI institute estimates the costs of a pandemic to be between 1.1 and 3.3 per 
cent of GDP for Germany (see Financial Times Deutschland 17/1/06)). This range is close to 




We have estimated the costs of a pandemic using a macro-model for the EU-25. We report 
GDP losses under various assumptions. In our baseline scenario we find for the first year of a 
pandemic, that is for 2006, a supply effect of - 1.1 per cent of GDP and a demand effect of - 
0.5 per cent, totalling a fall in GDP of - 1.6 per cent. These effects diminish sharply for 2007 
and 2008 but a long-run negative effect of - 0.6 per cent remains due to the reduction in the 
labour force caused by the pandemic. Additional effects can be added to this scenario. If we 
do so, we end up with an estimate of the GDP loss ranging between 2 and 4 per cent. Our 
results are in line with those of recent studies that explore the macroeconomic effects of a 
pandemic for other countries and regions. 
Our estimate of the macroeconomic cost of a pandemic in Europe is high, as we have 
investigated a rather severe medical scenario with a mortality rate higher than that of the 
Spanish influenza in Europe in 1918-1920. Still, such a pandemic does not have to spell 
economic disaster for Europe. The macroeconomic effects of a future pandemic as estimated 
here are roughly of the same size as those of a major recession.  
                                                 
11 The impact of the SARS epidemic in Hong Kong is estimated to amount to a decline in annual GDP 
growth of 1.8 per cent. Data supplied by Helen Chan, principal economist of Central Government 
Offices, Hong Kong.   
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Table 1: T  he baseline scenario. QUEST-simulation results: Deviations of GDP levels from  
                the baseline projection. Per cent 
 
Year  Supply and Demand Effects 
 
Supply and demand (with 
additional demand effects) 
(extreme case) 
    Supply (i)  Demand (ii)  Total (iii)  Total (iv) 
2006 -1.1  -0.5  -1.6  -3.3 
2007 -0.6  +0.1  -0.5  -0.8 










Mining and quarrying  -10
Manufacturing  -10
Electricity, gas and water supply  0
Construction  -10
Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale of automotive 
fuel  -10
Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles  -10
Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of personal and household 
goods  -10
Hotels & catering  -80
Inland transport  -67
Water transport  -67
Air transport  -67
Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities of travel agencies  -67
Communications  0
Financial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding  0
Insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security  0
Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation  0
Real estate activities  -5
Renting of machinery and equipment  0
Computer and related activities  0
Research and development  0
Legal, technical and advertising  0
Other business activities  -5
Public administration and defence; compulsory social security  0
Education  0
Health and social work  15
Other community, social and personal services  -80
Private households with employed persons  0
Total    -11.3
 
Note: We apply the same assumptions as the CBO study for the decline of demand in individual 
sectors. 





Table 3: Annual growth effects and the start of a pandemic 
(Deviation of growth rates relative to the baseline scenario) 
 2006  2007 
1
st Quarter  -1.6  1.0 
2
nd Quarter  -1.4  0.9 
3
rd Quarter  -1.2  0.7 
4
th Quarter  -1.1  0.4 
 
Comment: The second and third column give the annual average growth rates for 2006 and 2007.   
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Table 4: Estimated output losses due to a future pandemic. Some recent estimates. Per cent of  
               GDP 
 
Country/Region  Author  Range of estimates (min. to 
max) 





Canada James  and  Sargent 
(2006) 
0.2 – 1.0 
Germany   FT Deutschland 
17/1, 2006 
1.1 – 3.3 
World   McKibbin  and 
Sidorenko (2006)   




Figure 1: Growth effects on EU-25 of a pandemic starting in the second quarter of 2006. 
                 Baseline scenario 








2005Q4 2006Q2 2006Q4 2007Q2 2007Q4
supply only supply + demand extreme case
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Figure 2: The impact of SARS in Hong Kong during the second quarter of 2003. Quarterly  
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Share inTotal EU25 
Imports 
 from Extra-EU25 
Americas 
(excl USA)  China 
EU 
neighbours India  Japan 
South East 
Asia 
(excl China)  USA 
 Total  Imports 100 7.1 12.4 31.5 1.6 7.7 11.9 15.2 
344 Petroleum  Gases 0.04 0.0 0.0 96.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 
023 Butter 0.02 1.7 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 93.2 0.1 
272 Fertilizers  Crude 0.04 2.7 0.1 92.9 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 
043 Barley Unmilled 0.01 4.3 0.0 92.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 
333 Petroleum  Oils 10.93 2.3 0.0 92.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
342 Liquefied Propane And Butane  0.21 1.1  0.0 90.8 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.7 
562 Fertilizers  (Other Than Those Of Group 272) 0.19 2.7  0.2 90.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 
345  Coal Gas Water Gas Producer Gas And Similar Gases  0.00 0.0  0.0 5.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 89.8 
672 Ingots And Other Primary Forms Of Iron Or Steel 0.20 6.5  0.9 89.0 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.9 
783  Road Motor Vehicles  0.04 1.0  0.2 88.3 0.0 0.3 0.1 3.7 
244  Cork Natural Raw And Waste  0.00 0.1  10.6 87.8 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.4 
011  Meat Of Bovine Animals  0.10 87.0  0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 4.6 0.2 
792 Aircraft  1.55 5.8 0.3 4.5 0.1 1.0 1.0 83.4 
334 Petroleum  Oils 2.15 4.5 0.0 81.9 1.6 0.0 1.3 3.9 
261 Silk 0.01 4.1  80.4 12.0 2.7 0.5 0.1 0.1 
422 Fixed  Vegetable Fats And Oils Crude Refined Or Fractionated Other Than  0.21 3.2  0.3 0.7 4.4 0.1 80.3 1.0 
231 Natural  Rubber 0.14 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.7 0.0 79.2 0.2 
282  Ferrous Waste And Scrap 0.23 5.4  0.1 79.0 0.2 0.0 0.6 9.0 
579 Waste  Parings And Scrap Of Plastics  0.00 2.6  1.2 78.3 0.1 1.5 1.0 7.0 
073 Chocolate 0.03 5.4 0.6 77.5 0.0 0.2 0.7 4.4 
812 Sanitary Plumbing And Heating Fixtures  0.08 1.3  10.6 77.2 0.2 0.6 3.7 1.8 
676  Iron And Steel Bars Rods Angles Shapes And Sections 0.27 4.1  1.4 77.1 1.9 1.2 2.5 2.6 
081 Feeding Stuff For Animals  0.58 75.8  0.5 8.0 0.2 0.1 4.4 9.3 
351 Electric  Current 0.22 0.0 0.0 75.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
283 Copper Ores And Concentrates  0.16 75.0  0.0 5.1 0.0 0.0 14.0 0.0 
035  Fish Dried Salted Or In Brine; Smoked Fish  0.06 5.8  1.4 74.9 0.0 0.0 0.5 2.8 
813 Lighting Fixtures And Fittings 0.27 0.3  73.8 7.7 2.2 0.7 6.1 4.8 
016  Meat And Edible Meat Offal Salted In Brine  0.00 10.0  0.0 72.8 0.0 0.1 0.7 0.8 
831  Travel Goods Handbags And Similar Containers 0.43 0.3  72.6 6.4 5.8 0.3 10.8 1.4 
971 Gold  Non-Monetary (Excluding Gold Ores And Concentrates) 0.34 4.6 0.1 72.0 0.1 0.1 1.8 0.5 
421 Fixed  Vegetable Fats And Oils  0.10 17.1  0.2 71.3 4.1 0.0 0.5 2.0 
961 Coin  (Other Than Gold Coin) Not Being Legal Tender 0.00 4.2 2.8 71.2 0.0 0.3 4.4 9.6 
044 Maize  (Not Including Sweet Corn) Unmilled  0.07 69.9  0.6 15.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 10.9 
894 Baby Carriages Toys Games And Sporting Goods 1.11 1.3  69.5 4.7 0.5 3.8 7.7 7.1 
597 Prepared Additives For Mineral Oils And The Like 0.05 3.5  0.2 16.7 0.3 4.6 1.0 68.6 
791 Railway Vehicles 0.08 2.9 0.6 68.2 0.2 0.5 17.4 7.9 
673  Flat-Rolled Products Of Iron Or Non-Alloy Steel Not Clad Plated Or Coated 0.34 8.7  5.7 67.8 7.4 0.5 3.5 0.3 
714 Engines And Motors Non-Electric  1.32 7.2  2.0 7.6 0.4 3.0 3.2 67.7 
684 Aluminium 0.87 9.7 0.7 66.1 0.2 0.4 1.0 3.4 
017  Meat And Edible Meat Offal Prepared Or Preserved N.E.S. 0.07 66.0  0.0 4.3 0.0 0.0 26.3 0.2 
059 Fruit  Juices 0.13 65.8  2.8 15.2 0.2 0.0 6.1 6.2 
686 Zinc 0.04 11.2 1.0 65.6 0.0 0.2 11.7 4.9 
223  Oil Seeds And Oleaginous Fruits  0.02 64.3  10.1 8.0 0.8 0.1 2.7 2.9 
325  Coke And Semi-Coke  0.18 1.4  64.1 17.3 0.0 1.8 7.9 1.6 
024  Cheese And Curd 0.04 4.7 0.0 63.1 0.0 0.0 29.0 0.1 
633 Cork  Manufactures 0.01 4.0 10.6 62.6 0.3 0.2 9.0 4.9 
222  Oil Seeds And Oleaginous Fruits.  0.45 62.2  3.6 6.3 1.8 0.0 1.3 23.4 
274 Sulphur And Unroasted Iron Pyrites 0.00 6.4  1.0 61.8 0.3 0.2 11.3 0.2 
883 Cinematograph Film Exposed And Developed 0.00 7.4  0.2 9.0 2.6 1.4 9.3 61.7 
247  Wood In The Rough Or Roughly Squared 0.14 2.9  0.0 61.6 0.0 0.1 1.3 6.8 
 